international bodies. This is a phenomenon not only in the quasi-federal system of the European Union but, as further discussed in this article, a reality in many areas such as international environmental law setting rules on fisheries, forestry and air pollution as well as in mattes such as food safety with the codex alimentarius or banking regulation with standards being set by the Basel committee. Such delegation, in turn, often in practice leads to an almost mandatory application of the content of foreign rules in the domestic legal system -both in the form of rules established on the international or supranational level, as well as in the form of mutual recognition and enforcement of rules established in foreign jurisdictions. Examples for such obligations arise from the WTO's TBT and SPS agreements. An important phenomenon of modern public law is thereby the permeation of the link between rule-making and the territorial reach of the law of a jurisdiction.
1 This Article therefore discusses various aspects and consequences of the phenomenon of de-territorialization of executive rule-making.
At issue is whether there are any standards for trans-territorial rule-making which could ensure compliance with key values of public law such as the rule of law, respect for fundamental rights, participatory forms of governing, and accountability of actors. In recent years, much thoughtful scholarship has been developed on "global administrative law". This scholarship seeks to understand the regulatory framework of international administrative cooperation as well as international organizations active in matters traditionally regarded as matters belonging to administrative law. 2 But these discussions also pre-date the coining of the phrase "global administrative law" in the academic literature. Many of the more traditional concepts addressing aspects of public law that transcend the territorial reach of public law have already been questioned in the context of the discussion of transnational law. 3 "Transnational law" is a term which is slightly misleading when it comes to public law, 4 because the link between the law and its applicability is not the "nation" given that many states are composed by multiple nations but the territorial reach of a jurisdiction. For this reason, focusing on executive rulemaking outside of states, this Article uses the more precise but less common term "transterritorial." In any case, "transnational" and "trans-territorial" both look specifically at those matters which "trans"-cend the traditional dichotomy of distinguishing between national versus international law and a clear delimitation of these spheres. The reality what one might describe as post-Westphalian 5 trans-territorial public law is that it transcends territorial limits of jurisdictions. The jurisdictional reach appears increasingly more akin to a continuum in which the purely national and the purely international -i.e.,
inter-state -are the two extremes of a range instead of a strict dichotomy. 6 Many options of the exercise of public powers lie in-between, and this Article focuses on these areas.
The concepts and consequences of this phenomenon discussed in this Article are mainly illustrated with the help of examples from the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Not only is the WTO probably the best known international structure to many readers, but it also offers a rich pallet of examples due to the complexity of topics addressed within the WTO and the relative maturity of its legal 3 The term was introduced into the mainstream legal debate by PHILLIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) . In the following years, the debate regarding rule-making had remained in a conflicts of law setting under the concept of the dichotomy between international administrative law (as the national law of conflicts in administrative matters) as well as on public international law governing international organizations. 4 The notion of transnational actually seems to have arson in the context of and as counterpart to "international law." Craig Scott, "Transnational Law" as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions, 10 GERMAN L.J. 859, 865-866 (2009). This was a further development of the "law of nations" which in effect is "interstate law." Id. He however argues that since "pretty well all users of 'transnational law' discourse understand this in the sense of 'trans-state' and, as such, from a theoretical perspective, it is arguable that nothing is lost to continue this convention." Id. at 866. However, one might, to the contrast, also argue that attempting to achieve terminological precision might contribute to clarity of conceptual thinking. In many respects the regulation of trade led to a spill-over of regulatory action into areas such as health and safety regulation, banking and insurance regulation, working conditions and labour regulation, taxation and distribution of tax powers, and protection of investments. Another source of trans-territorialization arose from the need to regulate consequences of activities which are not limited to territorially-defined political borders such as environmental regulation and, to a certain degree, regulation of the Internet.
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Despite the many differences amongst the "trans-territorialized" regulatory regimes, they both generally have the capacity to exercise considerable influence in domestic administrative practice and decision-making.
For reasons of clarity, the following mapping exercise of trans-territorial rulemaking will first look at unilateral rule-making which transcends the territorial limitations of a jurisdiction with de jure or de facto trans-territorial effect. It will then address trans-territorial rule-making by international organizations, standard setting, and rule-making by conditionality of financial aid by international banks.
B. Unilateral Rule-making with Trans-territorial Effect
The applicability of the public law of one jurisdiction in another jurisdiction is set Of those three factors, the most commonly applied factor in administrative rulemaking is the territoriality principle. Under a strict reading of that principle, states -and supranational organizations such as the EU -cannot enact measures on the territory of another state without the latter's consent. Positively formulated, the territoriality principle allows a state to exercise regulatory powers unilaterally with respect to all matters related to the territory, either (1) in the context of "subjective territoriality" -which provides a basis of jurisdiction over acts which originated within a foreign territory but were implemented or completed within the relevant state's own territory -or (2) in the context of "objective territoriality" -a connecting factor in cases in which the affected activity originates within a state's territory but is implemented or carried to its conclusion abroad. Moreover, bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements or treaties on customs unions frequently contain obligations of mutual recognition of foreign regulatory standards as equivalent to national ones. Where that is the case, a state or jurisdiction refusing to accept the regulatory approaches by others will have to prove that there are overriding concerns of public policy and that there exists a proportionate approach to the nonacceptance of a rule. The possible reasons for non-compliance with foreign law are predefined in WTO law and are generally related to public policy concerns regarding issues of health and safety, national security, and environmental protection to name just a few. 20 These difficulties of unilateral rule-making with trans-territorial effect in a globalizing world have led to an increasing demand for international organizations as arbiters and often standard setters.
C. Trans-territorial Rule-making by International Organizations
Many international organizations have been granted rule-making powers and in some cases, even single case decision-making powers. Such powers are conferred on traditional international organizations including as the already mentioned WTO. At first glance the WTO appears to be an international organization of this "classic" setting, with rules applicable between states and a small secretariat general administrating the treaty provisions. The WTO is, however, a highly judicialized organization by means of its interconnection and interoperability" of trans-territorial telecommunications traffic. They establish inter alia standards for international routing, charging, accounting and billing between operators and have been criticized for not sufficiently taking into account the non-territorial nature of the internet. 20 whether the treaty parties wanted to confer rights and obligations on individuals -in which case a treaty may be "self executing" -or whether the treaty only intended the state should be bound given, internally, the possibility to act differently even if, externally, the state is risking that it would be obliged to pay damages or suffer other sanctions for non-compliance. 29 The under WTO law in a specific ruling. 30 Next to the promulgation of "formal" international organizations active in the field of rule-making, also less formalized hybrid structures exist which contribute by setting standards for rule making and for mutual recognition.
D. Executive Rule-making by Standard Setting and the Creation of Conditionalities
De-territorialized rule-making often exists in the form of "soft" standard setting.
Rather than as directly applicable hard law, soft standard setting allows standardization on the transnational level to be undertaken by public bodies under public international law. It can also be the result of either networks of national public actors or private and public-private hybrid bodies. Public bodies establishing standards include, for example, The BCBS is a regulatory network that is thus not intergovernmental in nature but might be more aptly described as an inter-agency network -albeit of central banks that are traditionally very independent agencies of a state. 35 This network's key activity is the joint setting of standards in the form of guidelines for national and regional central banks. 36 A particularly influential example thereof is the "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards," developed in the form of the "Basel II" and successor "Basel III" standards, addressing regulation, supervision, and risk management of the banking sector.
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The Basel standards define criteria that private for-profit credit rating agencies must fulfill in order for their assessments to be used for regulatory purposes in the Basel rules on capital requirement for banks. 38 The specific decisions of private for-profit companies -i.e., the credit rating agencies -are thus incorporated by reference into public regulatory standards. This leads to an overall hybrid form of public-private regulation. Initially "soft" standards of banking regulation, which are the basis for rating agency activity, thus become hardened through reference in public documents to the results of these very agency ratings. 
B. De-constitutionalization
The development of trans-territorial rule-making regimes also has the effect of deconstitutionalization of rule-making procedures by, for example, circumventing participatory forms of rule-making and transparency requirements enshrined in national 46 They range from providing a framework for public action in the form of exchange of ideas and creating a forum for development of best practices to international organisations with their own (quasi-) judicial review procedures and those with specific enforcement regimes. Some organisations, like for example the WTO, are based on 'traditional' public international law concepts of state membership and state obligations. This goes so far as to project the illusion to be found throughout the language of the WTO agreements of "states" actually being involved in international commerce instead of individuals. Other forms of organisation like that of the OECD are, although traditionally established under public international law, more akin to networks. Further, informal inter-agency networks, such as the international competition network, set informal soft law standards for interpretation and law enforcement of law. Privately organised bodies are relevant to the notion of trans-territorial regulation such as was discussed above in the context of domain name registration through ICANN. 47 See VAN PUTTEN, supra note 43, at 3 (discussing the spread of globalization).
law. 48 The lack of overarching legal framework establishing values and principles, as well as serving as benchmark for acceptable procedures, is at the heart of deconstitutionalization through trans-territorialization. The question for trans-territorial rule-making is whether, and where, to look for alternative criteria of good executive rulemaking procedures which would legitimize the trans-territorial effect of rule-making. Of course, it would be naïve to expect a coherent hierarchically constructed set of constitutional norms, such as those citizens have become accustomed to in many national jurisdictions, for regulation of matters which now find themselves in the space inbetween the purely national and the purely international (in the sense of the traditional notion of public international law as law between states). The debate on the possibilities of constitutionalization of public international law, or some of its regimes such as the WTO, is a sufficient reminder as to the attractiveness of the goal as well as the difficulties associated with achieving it. 49 One of the problems that is evident when debating the constitutionalization of public international law based regimes is that there are obviously many different understandings of what would legitimately constitute a constitution. 50 To some, constitutionalization means establishing a framework of 'higher' legal principles. But the very absence of an identifiable constitutional foundation also gives rise to specific questions of accountability and legitimacy of regulatory activity beyond the territorially bound state. To others, the notion of a negotiated approach of rule-making, developed in a dialogue between different systems standing in non-hierarchic relations, carries in itself the core of a discursive approach leading to an outcome in some ways legitimated by deliberative elements.
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Such forum for deliberative intervention could serve as a constitutional forum.
More generally speaking, however, although, no policy-specific regime equals another, the values pursued under the heading of 'constitutionalization' can generally be described to include notions of accountability, transparency, democratic participation, and procedural justice in both the exercise of public functions and the protection of the rule of law. 52 Whether such values are protected in the context of trans-territorial executive cooperation or the delegation of powers to the international level depends on several factors generally related to the "hardening" of the legal regimes and the introduction of independent mechanisms of review and sanctioning. 53 The language of such approaches is related to legal notions valuing legal certainty over diplomatic negotiations. 54 In that sense, one of the central factors that appears to be influencing the real effect of trans-territorial rule-making is whether an international regime directly or indirectly confers rights and obligations on individuals. 55 If an act of trans-territorial rule-making has such effect, it will generally be of much higher significance to individuals. Further factors for relevance to individuals are also whether an agreement regulates itself or whether it -by means of cross referencing -makes more or less binding standards or by hybrid forms of rule-making.
Whether the procedure leading to an act of transnational rule-making directly or indirectly protects individual rights therefore might be regarded to depend both on the procedure provided for in the rule-making regime and the procedural standards which, in the alternative, would be applicable on the national level. In some cases, international protection of individual rights should contend with a lowering of the standards of procedural rights offered to her or him by an international regime is a complex question.
It relates to how participatory government and transparency of a legal system are valued.
It also relates to the question whether the potential specific values purported by a rulemaking regimes such as having environmental or trade benefits spread to a greater amount of individuals around the world, outweigh the potential reduction of individual influence on specific rules as a consequence of the spreading of trans-territorial rulemaking.
Where trans-territorial rule-making activities develop direct effect, the question might be whether it would be possible to protect individual rights in the procedure of rule-making, at the rule-making level, through internal control and balance mechanisms that can be independently reviewed. These internal controls are the strongest when individuals have rights of access and can ensure remedies. 56 Also, where there is no court-like structure, internal accountability mechanisms such as those developed by the World Bank or the EIB can serve as examples of internal control. 57 With the effective establishment of consequences for a finding of wrongdoing, the persuasive effect of rules might grow, and with it, the role of the rule of law over diplomatic negotiations.
An alternative might be the protection of rights on the "enforcement"-level, which is often the state level. This might be especially relevant in cases of failure of the decision-making level to comply with basic requirements of the rule of law, of procedural justice, or of fundamental rights. 58 The challenge has been described well by Joerges who states:
[T]ransnational governance poses fundamental challenges for all international legal disciplines and their commitments to constitutional democracies; if, and, indeed, because transnational governance emerges beyond the realms that states can control, it poses a threat to the type of legitimacy that the citizens of constitutional states feel entitled to expect. And the search for legitimate transnational governance would be hopeless if legitimacy were equated with the type of demos-anchored constitutionalism that nation states have established. 59 The question thus appears very much to be a question of the pluralism of legal orders resulting in a mutual control between regimes -be they on the international or the national levels.
C. Empowerment of the Executive
This discussion, however, is in itself a case in point of the fact that the Solutions to these types of questions could be imagined by mixing the models, of purely expertise-based decision making with more broad pluralist participation in order to attempt to counter-balance disadvantages associated with each. Difficulties, of adding participatory procedures outside of the national context, however, exist. These include the questions how participatory procedures could be designed in which stake-holders are sufficiently aware of the legal framework and will not experience problems of access to information and active participation due to language problems. Addressing these problems on a national scale is already not easy. Trying to develop such models on a scale involving all interests which are outside of the deciding jurisdiction has the potential to multiply these difficulties.
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS As a result of the aforementioned consequences, one might infer that the more the individual rights or economic interests of the parties subject to rule-making are affected, the more it might be relevant to ensure compliance with basic constitutional values such as the principle of legality, proportionality, accountability, transparency, rights of defense, and rights of participation, to name a few. These values should not be made subject or victim of the de-territorialization of executive rule-making procedures.
Administrations either seeking to enhance effectiveness of their activities through delegation of powers to bodies outside their jurisdictions or engaging in international cooperation should ensure that the exercise of these powers does not compromise fundamental values. One possible approach might be to consider creating an now is to analyze the possibility of generalizing some of their approaches across policy sectors. Even if one were not to achieve an international convention on trans-territorial rule-making, the learned legal community might be able to begin distilling requirements for legitimate trans-territorial rule-making from these and similar examples.
